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INTRODUCTION 
 
As International Organization for Migration stresses, labor migration has moved to 
the top of the policy agenda of many countries of origin and destination 
(www.iom.int/jahia/page706.html). The phenomenon of labor mobility has been 
shaped by three factors: demographic and labor markets pressure in receiving 
countries, poverty and unemployment in sending areas and a network of migrants at 
the two ends of the spectrum. These factors will play a crucial role in the future as 
well. Although a large proportion of labor migration occurs in a irregular way 
governments are developing regulatory mechanisms to manage labor mobility. Even 
in the United States – a country traditionally using irregular path of migration as the 
main source of the foreign labor recruitment the recent immigration debate focused 
on possibilities to create  temporary workers programs in order to relieve pressure on 
the border. 
 
The opening of labor markets by the UK, Ireland and Sweden in May 2004 for 
workers from eight new member states was supposed to serve, for receiving 
economies, as a kind of guest-workers’ supply program. Recent tendencies in Irish 
discourse when some politicians propose foreign unemployed workers to get a lump 
sum payment of up to six months’ worth of unemployment benefit on the condition 
they agree to return home, support, in my opinion, this thesis 
(http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0905/1220544893448.html). 
Associations with the migratory ‘climate’ after 1973 oil-crisis seem to be inevitable.  
 
At the beginning of this century, the European Union became a global leader in 
attracting immigrants both in terms of immigrants stocks and flows. This deep 
transformation in the global migratory geography was the result of strategies in 
immigration policies in both the US and in the EU-15 countries.   
 
The shift in strategy of American and European migration policy in the field of labor 
migration is connected not only with internal political transformations, but also with 
global processes. As a result of events of 11 September 2001 the migrations became 
an issue remaining in extremely close connection with internal security. The hitherto 
expressed anxieties of politicians and mass media representatives, concerning the 
phenomenon of illegal immigration worldwide that – according to opinion of some of 
them – has slipped out of control, have taken a new dimension. 
 
However, Teitelbaum (2002) considers the statements in concern with global 
migrational pressure exceeding the state control abilities as gravely exaggerated. 
To confirm his thesis, he quotes the words of French analyst Patrick Weil, who 
stated, after having compared changes and directions of migration's policy 
development in Germany, France, United Kingdom and USA, that: 
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The recent evolution of immigration policies demonstrates the adaptability of the 
democratic developed States. In reaction to increased migration pressure and the 
extension of rights of migrants, States have answered by mobilizing more legal, 
financial and bureaucratic means. Therefore the transformation of migration into a 
world-wide phenomenon has not automatically involved an increase in immigration 
flows. When the level of uncontrolled flows is still high, as in the United States, it 
depends more on cultural and historical than on economic or demographic factors 
(Weil, 1998:18). 
 
This paper is a testimony of a period of important geopolitical changes and 
modernization, and of the accompanying deep transformations, both quantitative and 
qualitative in their nature, in the area of international mobility as perceived in its 
transatlantic, European (EU), and Polish (Central European, new member states) 
dimension.  
 
The author, basing on the analysis of the strategies for the migration policies of two 
countries: the USA and Great Britain, both of which are united by the transatlantic 
idea and cooperation, seeks and answer to the fundamental question about the 
factors underlying a state’s decision not to spare efforts and initiate the required 
changes in its migration policy.  
 
On both the sides of the Atlantic there are countries with a similarly long history of 
being immigrant-receiving territories and with a similar culture in this context. Both of 
them have worked on effective mechanisms to absorb migrant labor force for years, 
in both of them there are migration channels that have stood the test of time, and 
both of them have a strong tradition of receiving and accepting migrants. 
 
The attempt at reforming the American migration law by the administration of George 
W. Bush in the years 2004-2007, and the opening of the British labor market to 
migrants from the new Member Countries by the government of Tony Blair in 2004 
constitute the fundamental changes leading towards the liberalization of the migration 
policies in both of the countries: either with regard to the legal labor migration 
management (Great Britain, and a failed attempt on the part of the USA), or as 
regards visas (the USA) or a radical change in the traditional flow directions (Great 
Britain). 
 
Great Britain’s active and liberal migration policies in the area of labor migration 
which had led to a mass migration from Poland met with a response on the part of 
Poland which amended its own immigration law. The changes resulted in a gradual 
but quick liberalization of the rules governing the access of migrant workers from the 
eastern neighboring countries to the Polish labor market. The restrictive policies of 
the USA towards legal migration from Poland, in combination with the liberalization of 
the relevant policies on the part of Great Britain, Ireland, or Sweden, have resulted, 
to a considerable degree, in a decrease in the historically and emotionally positive 
attitudes towards the USA, and, in consequence, to a fall of the American myth as a 
temporary and settlement migration destination in the eyes of young Poles.  
 
RECENT US IMMIGRATION DEBATE 
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Latest debate concerning immigration in the USA involved and still involves four 
important issues: strengthening of southern borders, facilitating of access to 
citizenship, regulating of status of illegal immigrants and working out labor migration 
programs. The main current in the discourse is related to the illegal influx from South 
America, whereas the matter of visas, including lifting thereof for new EU member 
states is a marginal issue in the immigration debate from the American point of view.  
 
The latest immigration debate in the USA disclosed existence of powerful pressure 
groups promoting greater influx of legal wage immigrant's instead of traditional using 
the illegal emigrants inflowing in large numbers from the South America countries by 
the employers. The framework of the discussion on internal security and immigration, 
sharpened after the events of 11 September 2001, revealed the contradiction 
between the American idea of multicultural society and a trend considering the 
Anglo-Saxon character of American culture as a superior value. 
 
MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO U.S.- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Many stereotypes associated with migration are rooted in the perception of 
population outflows and influxes as settlement migrations. A European crossing the 
Atlantic Ocean in search of a better life constitutes the embodiment of a migrant from 
the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries1. He was never to return to his homeland. 
Therefore, these migration stereotypes are still alive in both researchers and 
politicians. When analyzing them, we use such words as „exodus” (in the case of 
sending countries) or „flooding” (in the case of receiving countries). However, as 
Hugo (2003) noticed, in the contemporary situation, a question arises whether 
temporary migration is really a prelude to permanent settlement? 
 
Poland has been the country of intense migration. Post-war migration can be divided 
into direct emigrations (departures from Poland abroad, ending in temporary or 
permanent stays) and indirect emigrations, in the case of those who could not return 
to Poland after war and emigrated from current countries of stay2.  
 
The tradition of Polish emigration to the U.S. has a long past. The first information on 
Poles in Northern America dates back to the 17th century. The first, more accurate 
estimates of numbers of Polish people in the USA go back to the period prior to the 
First World War and suggest that there were 3 million Poles staying in the USA3. 
Descriptions of emigration from Poland to America indicate various reasons and 
waves of emigration. The latter range from the emigration of Polish peasants in the 
years 1890-1914, motivated by purely economic reasons and called the emigration of 
„ founders” to  war emigration of „soldiers” between the years 1944-1948 which was 
characterized by a relatively high level of education.  
 
                                                 
1
 Graham, H., 2004, ‘Circular migration: Keeping Development Rolling’? Migration Information Source. 
2
 Pilch, A. i M. Zgórniak, (eds), 1984, Emigracja z ziem polskich w czasach nowoŜytnych i 
najnowszych, PWN, Warszawa. 
3
 Pilch A., 1988. ‘Emigracja z ziem polskich do Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki od lat pięćdziesiątych 
XIX do r. 1918’, in: Kubiak H., Kusielewicz E., Gromada (eds.) Polonia 
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Subsequent waves of Polish migration to the States include the economically-driven 
wave of „consumers” in the years 1950-1980 and the wave of „solidarity activists” in 
the years 1980-1989, motivated by mixed politico-economic factors4. 
 
The most recent wave overlaps the period of economic transformation, with 
economically-driven emigration of whole families remaining the dominating type of 
outflow. 
 
The analyses of magnitude of Polish emigration in a historical and transatlantic 
context revealed that labor migration as early as at the turn of the 20th century was 
perceived differently depending on whether it was to Europe or to America.  At that 
time the myth of America as a paradise for emigrants was deeply rooted in the 
mentality of Poles. More importantly, what this myth included were both economic 
(high earnings) and moral (work ethos, Puritanism) factors.  
 
Migration to Europe had definitely negative connotations. A migrant to Europe was 
described as „…he is walking about idly and becomes influenced by a city proletariat, 
with which he can get on with easily”, or: „…they make the most of world there, 
nobody to watch over them, no father, no mother and no priest, nobody to be afraid 
of ...”5. Unlike the migrant in Europe, the American one „…is bound to stick to his own 
kind and be controlled by them, or at least he is surrounded by people who work and 
save money diligently ”6.  
 
The myth of America is also that of a birth of a Polish peasant, who freed himself of a 
„villein soul” syndrome, “with its social value and power, the myth of a peasants’ 
Poland was projected onto the lands of a New World.” 7 
It is worth remembering that what has contributed to the emergence of the myth of 
America as a paradise for emigrants i.e. building enclaves for „their own kind” - is the 
U.S immigration policy with the reunion of families being one of its key components.8.  
 
                                                 
4
 Mostwin D., 1991, Emigranci polscy w USA, KUL, Lublin; Mostwin D., 1999. Rodzina przeszczepiona 
z perspektywy trzydziestu lat, Archiwum Emigracji, z.2. Toruń. Kubiak H., 1975, Rodowód narodu 
amerykańskiego, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie; Walaszek A., 1994, Światy imigrantów. Tworzenie 
polonijnego Cleveland 1880-1930, Nomos, Kraków. 
5
 Thomas, W.I. i F. Znaniecki (1976: 29), Chłop polski w Europie i Ameryce, LSW, Warszawa, citation  
after Bukraba –Rylska (2007:29). 
6
 Bujak, F., (1903:101), śmiąca. Wieś powiatu limanowskiego, Gebether i s-ka. Poznań, citation after 
Bukraba –Rylska (2007:29).  
7
 Duda-Dziewierz, K.,(1938:152), Wieś małopolska a emigracja amerykańska. Studium wsi Babica 
powiatu rzeszowskiego. Polski Instytut Socjologiczny. Warszawa-Poznań.  
8Slany, K., 1995,  Miedzy przymusem a wyborem, Kontynentalne i zamorskie emigracje z krajów 
Europy Środkowo-Wschodnie, 1939-1989, UJ, Kraków. 
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MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO U.S.- CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: OFFICIAL 
DATA AND GMF US-CIR SURVEY RESULTS9  
 
 
OFFICIAL DATA 
 
Migrations in Poland in the 1990s were primarily caused by a political system and 
socio-economic transformation which led to then apparently permanent changes in 
international mobility of population and gradual transition of Poland from an 
emigration country to an emigration and immigration country.10 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the population of our part of Europe is witnessing 
yet another intense wave of migration in the economic circumstances associated with 
strengthening processes of European integration and globalization. The immigration 
component is quite visible in official Polish statistics, however the emigration factor is 
definitely prevalent. Along with the drop in birth rate, migrations were the second 
component of a real diminution of the Polish population.  
 
New tendencies have been observed since the 1st of May 2004 in population flows in 
Poland which are predominantly associated with the change of the geopolitical 
situation, the latter being the driving force of multiplication of demographic, economic 
and social factors, leading to one of the biggest Polish migration waves in the post-
war period.   
 
The most recent estimates of the Central Statistical Office indicate that at the end of 
2007 nearly 2.4 million Polish citizens migrated temporarily abroad, over 1.9 million 
to Europe.  
More stringent enforcement of U.S. immigration policy, focusing to a large extent on 
the internal security dimension, has been observed since the 11th of September 
2001.  Increased restrictions of migration policy generally entail a decline in number 
of legal migrants, at the same time causing the increase in illegal migrants, 
responding to a permanent economic demand for cheap, foreign labor. It is not 
however the case of migration from Poland to the U.S.  
The following tendencies  in migration from Poland to U.S. have been observed since 
the European Union enlargement in 2004:  
• numbers of legal immigrants have remained at approximately same level since 
1996;  
• position of the U.S. among the destinations of Polish labor migration shifted 
from number two (prior to the EU enlargement) to number five; 
• U.S. became less attractive to young and educated people  
                                                 
9
 Two surveys on labor migration from Poland to US and UK after 1 May 2004  were conducted within 
the scheme of grant #42043 ‘Costs and benefis of temporary labor migration. Policy solutions for new 
migration patterns’. 
10Iglicka, K., 2001, Poland’s Post-War Dynamic of Migration, Aldershot, Ashgate.  
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The chart 1 below demonstrates a rotating number of legal immigrants from Poland 
in the last 15 years. After the period of increased naturalization in the first half of the 
1990s (numbers then varied from 20 thousand to 30 thousand), there was a dramatic 
decline in the number of legal residents (immigrants) coming from Poland. These 
numbers have remained at a fairly stable level, ranging from 10 thousand to 15 
thousand. 
Chart 1 Legal immigrants from Poland in the United 
States 1990-2007 (in thousand)
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Source: For years 1990-1997, Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, DHS, 
Washington, various years; for years 1998-2007: 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2007/table03d.xls. 
Data received from an American immigration bureau indicates that Polish people still 
form an ethnical diaspora. In 2005, out of a total number of 15 352 Polish legal 
immigrants 5 626 resided in the state of Illinois, 3 106 in the state of New York and 
1 705 in the state of New Jersey, i.e. in the regions which have been traditionally 
inhabited by Polish immigrants for last two centuries. 
As far as unauthorized immigrants are concerned while analyzing the total number of 
illegal immigrants in the US from Europe, which according to Hook, Bean and Passel 
(2005) reached 600,000 in 2004 only 300,000 came from the former Soviet Union, 
Poland and Great Britain. The more precise data on illegal immigrants from Poland 
are however, unknown. Definitely it is not a big number in the total stock of illegals 
estimated at 9-10 millions. 
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Table 1 Illegal immigrants in the United States by region and country of origin in 2004 (in%). 
Region/Country % 
Mexico 57 
Central and South 
America 
24 
Asia 9 
Europe 9 
Africa 6 
Total 100 
Source: Hook, Bean, Passel, 2005 
 
EU enlargement in 2004 led to tremendously significant qualitative changes in 
international population flows. The data below (chart 2), generated from BAEL 
database and demonstrating the group of over 6 000 labor migrants who have stayed 
abroad for no longer than 12 months indicates clearly that the countries traditionally 
receiving the largest numbers of Polish migrants, i.e. Germany and the U.S., ceased 
to be the leaders in that domain. Great Britain has taken the leading position whereas 
the US shifted from the second place (occupied prior to EU accession) to fifth place. 
It is a significant drop, given the fact that the European leader - Germany - went 
down just by one place.  
 
Chart 2 Main destinations for Polish labour migrants  
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Decline of the U.S. popularity as a migration destination for young and educated 
people is also accentuated by official data on visa issuance. In 2007 only 13 500 
students enrolled in the Work & Travel program which enables students to work and 
stay/travel in the USA during holidays for a period no longer than 4 months. In 2006 
16 500 students participated in the program and 19 50011 in 2005. We have 
witnessed in the last two years a decrease in the number of program participants by 
over 40% (see chart 3).  
 
Chart 3 Number of  Work&Travel participants 2005-
2007 (in thousand)
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Source: Bielecki, 2008 
                                                 
11
 Bielecki, J. Polacy nie śnią juŜ o Ameryce, Dziennik, 30.01. 2008 
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GMF US – CIR SURVEY  RESULTS ON LABOR MIGRATION FROM POLAND TO US12. 
The results shown below refer to the survey research done in the summer and 
autumn 200713.  The objectives of the Project included research on:  
 
• dependencies between the educational level and the amounts of money 
transferred by migrant workers; 
• role of money transfers from migrant workers contributing to a better standard 
of living; 
• role of visas /of liberal migration policies as impact factors in job migrations 
from Poland   
• attractiveness of the countries being the main destinations for migrant workers 
from Poland; 
• integration and assimilation of Poles in their host communities. 
 
The survey research covered a group of 564 Poles employed legally in the USA 
under the Work and Travel Program. 
 
It is impracticable to do this type of survey on random samples. Consequently, we 
decided on purposeful sampling.   
 
With regard to Poles legally employed in the USA, we decided to run the interviews 
with participants in the Work and Travel Program in Poland. The Work and Travel 
Program enjoys widespread popularity. Over its more than dozen year long history 
tens of thousands of students have been legally offered placements at US 
companies under the Program. The Program is generally acknowledged as a highly 
renowned one. It is not unusual for students to apply for participation in it on an 
annual basis. Those eligible must be between 18 and 30 years old. Having regard to 
the fact that our interests were focused on the quantitative dimension of such 
phenomena as those including opinions on the US restrictive migration policies / the 
role of visas, on the attractiveness of the USA as a destination country for migrant 
workers and for potential settlers, and on contacts with Poles violating provisions of 
the US migration law, we have decided to do our survey on a sample of as many as 
564 respondents despite the uniformity of the target population.      
  
The sampling was purposeful, and the migration data were stratified by sex and by 
place of residence (area of origin). The idea behind such stratification is that the 
migration behaviors of the survey sample, however uniform it is, may differ due to 
such factors as the area of origin or sex. 
 
As it follows from the Work&Travel experience, participation in the Program is 
dominated by population of small and medium-sized towns, with a higher percentage 
of men. In order to outline, in the general profile of the sample group, the qualities 
related to the area of origin of the participants in the Program we decided to interview 
                                                 
12
 Grant#42043 
13
 For detailed analysis of survey results see Iglicka, 2008 
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respondents both at universities and in dormitories. The survey covered students 
pursuing the full-time studying option, from two State-owned universities: the 
University of Warsaw (384 respondents) and the Warsaw School of Economics (180 
respondents). The survey was conducted in the summer and autumn of the 2007 
year. What deserves special mention here is that the survey covered, in a way, 
migration elite i.e. young people attending elite Warsaw-based State-owned 
institutions of higher education.  
 
The results are not representative. The survey, as it was mentioned before, was 
done among  ‘migration elite’: full-time students attending elite Warsaw universities. 
What is typical of that group is, in my opinion, their young age on the one hand (the 
average age of Respondent at the time of his/her leaving for the USA: 22.7 years 
old), and the surprising maturity of their opinions and attitudes, on the other hand. 
Our analysis of the survey allows reflection as below. The surprising factors:   
 
• strong rationalization of the migration strategies and of the gains/losses 
account in the decision makers’ migration calculus (number of visits to the 
USA -average earnings, earnings-savings-investments); 
• ambivalent attitudes expressed in the opinions on the possible consequences 
of removal of the USA visa requirements  
• number of contacts with Poles violating provisions of the USA migration law;  
• strong rationalization of the argumentation respecting assessment of the 
attractiveness of the USA as a job migration destination compared to the EU 
in respect of the working conditions and the earnings; 
• fall of the American myth in the context of migration of settlers; 
• emotions expressed in the patriotic attitudes towards Poland and in the 
cultural differences between Poland and the USA; 
• relatively high (as compared with the age) international mobility of the 
analyzed sample; 
• higher international mobility of women. 
 
It was men who were the predominant group in the sample (56%), with the remaining 
44% of women. 
 
Average age of the respondents at the time of their leaving for the USA: 22.7 years 
old. 
 
In the analyzed sample 29% of respondents came from cities with population of over 
200 thousand, while the countryside was represented by not even 3%. The largest 
percentage of respondents (60%) reported coming from small and medium-sized 
towns with population between 10 thousand to 200 thousand.  
 
The interviewers asked about the number of visits to the USA under the Work and 
Travel Program. Where the number of such visits was considerable, the next 
questions referred to the last visit only. 
 
Respondents who had left for the USA more than once accounted for 21% of the 
analyzed sample. It was women who showed a stronger inclination for repeated 
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visits. As many as 41% of them had left more than once under the Program as 
compared to 17% of the male respondents.  
 
The territorial diversification within the group of migrants who had left for the USA 
more than once seems to be similar to that which is representative for the whole 
sample. 
 
The average net earnings that prevailed in the survey sample amounted to 3,000 – 
4,000 PLN14 per month. Such were the amounts reported by 30% of the survey 
respondents. What deserves special mention is the fact that the next most often 
reported earnings interval was that over 6,000 PLN (22% of the respondents) 
 
The basic analysis of the survey sample structure shows a considerable 
differentiation with regard to the earnings level on the grounds of sex. As many as 
31% of the male respondents and only 12% of the female respondents reported 
earnings that were in excess of 6,000 PLN. At the same time, the percentage of 
women reporting the lowest monthly earnings, in the interval between 1,000 and 
3,000 PLN, was higher than that of men (17% compared to 11%). The average 
monthly earnings in the group of male survey respondents amounted to 4.720 PLN, 
and in the group of female survey respondents: to 4.230 PLN. 
 
Both the male and the female respondents used the multiple-visit strategy to increase 
their average monthly foreign earned income. It should be remembered that within 
the survey sample it was women who showed a stronger inclination for repeated 
visits abroad. As many as 41% of them, as compared to 17% of men, left under the 
Program more than once. On the other hand, men seemed to be more efficient in 
using their networks of contacts and references resulting from their previous stays in 
the USA under the Program: the average monthly earnings in their group (male 
respondents who had made more than one visit to the USA) amounted to 5,500 PLN. 
By comparison, the average monthly earnings for the corresponding group of women 
amounted to 4,750 PLN. 
 
80% of the respondents had brought home some savings from their stay in the USA. 
The percentage of men in that sub-group of the survey sample was higher than that 
of women (85% compared to 73%). Some respondents explained that the reason for 
their having no savings earned in the USA was their too low remuneration while in 
the States, and the unfavorable dollar exchange rates. In their opinion, it was more 
worth their while to spend the money earned in the USA on travelling around the 
States and on presents. However, it may be interesting to note that it was the female 
respondents, having their average monthly earnings lower than those of the male 
respondents, and accounting for a lower percentage of those saving the earned 
money, who reported higher savings. Consequently, the average amount of savings 
brought home from the stay in the USA per capita was that of 8,200 PLN for the 
women’s savings, and of 7,600 PLN for the men’s savings. 
 
As for the appropriation of savings by the most commonly cited purpose (as 
systematized by the Author of this analysis: the respondents were free to indicate 
                                                 
14
 As for October 2008 the exchange rate was  1 USD = 2.26 PLN 
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their own purposes), it did not differ for the respondents on the grounds of their sex. 
What seems odd here are the similar homo economicus attitudes adopted by both 
the male and the female respondents who indicated “stock investments” as the main 
purpose to which to apply their savings. Indeed, the years after 2004 marked in 
Poland a long boom in stocks which may partly explain such a conspicuous trend in 
the savings appropriation strategy followed by so many of the young people 
choosing, by virtue of their young age if not for any other reasons, more 
contemporary, but also more risky forms of saving money. What is meaningful in this 
context is the fact that it was only 7% of the respondents who deposited their savings 
earned in the USA in bank accounts. Additionally, some of the savings were also 
intended for tuition fees enabling further education, and for entertainment and travel 
abroad. This why the items “Current expenses / tuition fees” and “Foreign travel” top 
the list as numbers 2 and 3, accordingly. The dominant savings appropriation 
strategies adopted by respondents seem to be well thought over and highly rational.  
 
Part of the survey was focused on a number of issues including a ‘map’ of contacts 
between the survey respondents and other Poles. We were going to find out whether, 
according to our respondents being young Polish people leaving for the USA under a 
well organized program offering legal job placements at American companies which 
means that they did not have to keep in touch with any Polish communities living 
abroad, the problem of Poles violating provisions of the American immigration law is 
a conspicuous one. While conducting the survey we put aside such issues as a 
possible impact of potential contacts with compatriots upon the social or economic 
status of the respondents. Our whole attention was focused on the quantitative 
dimension of the issue of illegal migrations from Poland. Unfortunately, the situation 
as reflected by the survey results was not too optimistic.    
 
Most of the respondents (52% of them) met, while in the USA, Poles who, having 
been granted regular tourist visas, worked in the USA illegally. The respondents were 
of an opinion that it is common among Poles arriving in the USA as tourists to work 
illegally. This is additionally proved by the answers respecting the number of Poles 
met while in the USA. 37% of the respondents reported their contacts with 1 to 5 
individuals, while 8% referred to a dozen or several dozen cases. 
 
The situation related to illegal stays in the US seems slightly better. 38% of the 
survey respondents reported having met, while in the USA, Poles who had illegally 
extended their stays in the States after the visa expiry date. It is not easy to assess 
this value. However eager we could be to put it off by saying “It’s only 38%”, I would 
insist that it is, in fact, as much as 38 percent. 
 
The survey has not provided explicit answers to the problem of visas perceived as 
migration policy instruments. 30% of the respondents were of an opinion that visa 
requirements would prevent them from seeking jobs in the USA, while according to 
others (36% of the sample) visas would have nothing to do with the frequency of their 
job migrations to the USA. The remaining sub-group held no views on this issue. 
 
The survey reveals a clear differentiation of the visa-related opinions, by sex.  For 
41% of the female respondents removal of the visa requirements would not influence 
their potential decision on job migration to the USA. In the male respondents’ sub-
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group the percentage of “YES” and “NO” answers was balanced, and fluctuated 
around 30 percent in both the cases.  
 
Our survey was also focused on the attractiveness of the USA as a job migration 
destination for Poles after the EU enlargement.  
 
For as much as 72% of the survey respondents a possibility to work legally in the 
USA is not an attractive option. In this regard, no differentiation of the responses on 
the grounds of sex could be noticed. The percentage of both the male and the female 
respondents to whom a job in the USA was not an attractive option fluctuated around 
70 percent. As it has already been mentioned, the questionnaire also enabled the 
respondents to give full meaningful answers to a dozen or so questions, in addition to 
ticking the right possibility. The attractiveness of having a job in the USA was one of 
those issues on which we were interested to hear about the personal views of the 
respondents. 
 
As in the case of the responses related to investing the savings in the analyzed 
sample, the maturity of the opinions given by the respondents on the attractiveness 
of a job in the USA was striking. The respondents made it clear that the issues of the 
EU enlargement (and the resulting “openness” of the labor markets in the EU 
member countries to Poles) and of the attractiveness of having a job in the USA 
should not be linked together. They were of an opinion that a decisive, negative 
factor was that related to the unfavorable dollar exchange rate resulting in a relatively 
lower level of earnings (90% of the responses). The remaining respondents pointed 
out higher traveling costs and longer distances (making it impossible to visit their 
families in case they get ill or homesick) emphasizing, at the same time, the fact that 
the said factors were of a permanent nature, and were irrelevant to the EU 
enlargement. A motif that appeared in a number of survey responses was related to 
the mutual Polish and American relations connected with the existence of national 
stereotypes.  
 
What seems interesting is that the opinions given by the 13% of respondents 
according to whom chances for legal employment in the USA have not changed 
since the EU enlargement did not tie that fact to Poland’s accession to the European 
Union, either.  
 
Compared to some of the above quoted results which were not always easy to 
interpret in an explicit manner, the data respecting the survey respondents’ overall 
potential for migration to the USA are unusually clear. As much as 80% of the 
respondents gave a negative answer. Naturally, asking the respective question we 
started with the highest level of generalization. As a rule, while surveying the 
migration potential one gets the highest percentage of affirmative answers to the 
question “Have you thought about moving out of the country permanently?”, and as 
one proceeds to more detailed questions the number of affirmative answers gets 
smaller. However, in the case of the analyzed sample negative answers prevailed on 
the level of the most general question. 
 
The structure of answers, proved low attractiveness to the respondents of the USA 
as a migration destination, this time within the meaning of a migration destination for 
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settlers. What is interesting, in the grounds provided by the respondents for their 
individual decisions to remain in Poland an extremely emotional patriotic tone could 
clearly be heard.  
  
What may be surprising is the relatively high international mobility of the analyzed 
sample. As much as 28% of the respondents who got employed in the USA at least 
once after 1st May, 2004, managed to get a legal job in a EU member country as well, 
within the same period of time (i.e. by the autumn of 2007). The proportions, by sex, 
were quite balanced: 29% of the male respondents and 27% of the female 
respondents worked in a EU member country after 1st May, 2004.  
 
What is interesting, however, is the fact that in the group of female respondents who 
had experience of being employed in a EU member country as much as 35% of 
women reported having worked in the USA many times, while for men that proportion 
was much lower: 3%. Therefore, a more intensive international mobility of women is 
what deserves a special attention here.  
 
As it has already been mentioned, one of the focus areas of our survey research was 
the attractiveness of the USA as a migration destination for job seekers. It was the 
attractiveness of the USA within this meaning, or as perceived by the respondents 
assessing it as a migration destination, that underwent our further testing, with 
participation of those survey respondents who had already had comparable migration 
experience. What we understand by comparable migration experience for the 
purposes of this survey research is legal employment in any EU member country 
after 1st May, 2004. 
 
51% of the respondents who had worked in EU member countries as well opined that 
the working conditions in the USA were better. In general, those who considered the 
working conditions in the USA better than or comparable with those in a given EU 
country in which they worked after 2004 accounted for 59% of the sample. However, 
that assessment of the working conditions was strongly differentiated on the grounds 
of the sex of the respondents. Only 42% of the male respondents compared to as 
much as 64% of the female respondents were of an opinion that the working 
conditions in the USA were much better.  What was different were the respondents’ 
opinions on their earnings.  
 
Opinions in favor of the EU prevailed: 63% of the respondents considered earnings in 
the EU higher, based on their own experience. There was no differentiation of 
opinions in the analyzed sample on the grounds of the sex. 68% of the male 
respondents and 57% of the female respondents gave similar answers on that score. 
 
 
RECENT UK IMMIGRATION DEBATE 
 
In the past decade the UK has experienced a sweeping change in labor migration, 
that took place both in policy framework of the country, and in the number of 
immigrants entering through regular channels. In years 2004-7 the country received 
the largest inflow of foreign nationals in its history. The inflow of foreign nationals 
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through regular channels, who stay on migration longer than one year, rose from 
224,200 in 1996, reached a peak of 494,100 in year 2004, and amounted to 3.4 
million in the years 1997-2005 (OECD 2007). The change has been initiated by a 
centre-left administration that regards selective labor migration as a part of strategy 
aimed at enhancement of global competitiveness in a knowledge-based economy, 
and that delightedly address labor shortages in a period of almost full employment. 
During Blair administration period (1997-2007), as much as five new immigration 
laws were introduced, more than in any other area of social policy (Somerville 
2007).15 However, the changes have been rendered possible by a relatively docile 
opposition, and also media have generally accepted the economic reasons for labor 
migration (Boswell, 2007).  
 
However, a simultaneous restriction of possibilities for humanitarian categories of 
migrants turned up along with this expansiveness, and more symbolic and 
exclusionary debate concerning integration, citizenship and Britishness, especially in 
the wake of 9/11 and the 7/7 London terrorist attacks. Nevertheless this more open 
approach to labor migration is not necessarily as sustainable as it is supposed to be, 
especially when one considers increase in concerns about the social impact of 
immigration from Eastern Europe (Boswell, 2007), as is suggested by recent media 
reporting and party political discussion. 
 
 
MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO UK- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Polish populace in the UK emerged a result of several emigration waves. 
The first wave of "soldiers" arrived in the UK during the World War II. The biggest of 
the Polish waves of emigration to the UK (estimated at approx. 140,000) took place 
in these very forties, in the World War II period and directly after end of the war 
(Sword, Davies, Ciechanowski, 1989).  As early as in the forties, the London had 
become the site of the government of the Republic of Poland on emigration and 
remained as such until 1990. Strong Polish culture centers, both political and socio-
cultural, were sympathetic to the following waves of migration of Poles to the United 
Kingdom, as well as migrations of economic character (the 1960-1980 period) or 
political ones (the eighties) (Gorny, Kolankiewicz, 2002).   
 
MIGRATIONS FROM POLAND TO UK- CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT: OFFICIAL 
DATA AND GMF US-CIR SURVEY RESULTS  
 
 
OFFICIAL DATA 
 
Both settlement and temporary outflows from Poland after 1 May 2004 created the 
highest wave of migration during the whole post-war period with the small exception 
of the short period in the 1950s (see chart 4). At that time the rapid increase in the 
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 Namely,  the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999), the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
(2002), the Asylum and Immigration Act (2004), the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act (2006), 
and the UK Borders Act (2007). 
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emigration was caused by Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party 
(KC PZPR) that passed a resolution obligating the Ministry of the Interior to take a 
more favorable approach while considering ethnic German’s applications to emigrate, 
and to grant emigration permits to individuals unfit for work, women, children and 
pensioners seeking to reunite with their families (Lempiński,1987). 
 
Chart 4 Emigration from Poland 1950-2007
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Source: Statistical Yearbooks, Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, various years 
 
According to the official statistics the rapid increase in the official number of 
emigrants after 2004 can be related to the decision about settlement in the country of 
labor migration and a willingness to avoid paying taxes in Poland for work performed 
abroad as well16. As it was already mentioned, during the last decades the official 
registered numbers of emigrants were at stable level 20-25 thousand annually. 
However, in the year 2006 the number of emigrants reached almost 47 thousand and 
in the following year 35 thousand (GUS, 2008). 
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 The official definition of an emigrant used by the Central Statistical Office refers to a person who has 
requested to be deregistered from his/her permanent place of residence. A person registered as 
having his/her permanent place of residence in Poland also pays  taxes there. The regularities 
discernible with respect to requests for deregistration, which, according to the report of the Ministry of 
the Economy (Wpływ emigracji…2007) due to the short period of comparison (2003 and 2005 only) 
should be treated with reserve, point to some rather characteristic changes in the regional distribution. 
Namely, in 2005 there was an increased number of requests for deregistration in northern, western 
and southern Poland, with a drop of figures in Opole Silesia and a part of Masuria. In the case of these 
two regions this may be an indication of a shrinking pool of potential migrants. The highest number of 
deregistrations was reported in voivodeship capitals with a population of over 200 thousand – Olsztyn, 
Rzeszów, Gorzów Wielkopolski and Zielona Góra (Wpływ emigracji…2007:16). 
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Table 2. Data on emigration and immigration in 2004-2007.  
Year Emigration  Immigration 
2004 18,9 9,5 
2005 22,2 9,4 
2006 46,9 10,8 
2007  36, 3 
36  
 
15,1 
Source: Central Statistical Office data, various years. 
 
 
Character of the post accession mobility of Poles and lack of proper registers in the 
receiving countries and measures in Poland make researchers unable to study 
trends in data. There are however, some estimates of migration from Poland after 1 
May 2004 that can serve as quite good illustration of the volume of the mobility that 
occurred against all odds and took both the Polish and Western experts by surprise 
(see table 3 and 4). It does not seem reasonable, in my opinion, to argue whether the 
numbers reached one, two or three millions in reality. Both  academics and policy 
makers are pretty sure that there are much bigger than expected and, that the scale 
of this mobility has plenty of social and economic consequences for both receiving 
and sending areas. The mechanisms of this migration wave seem to be of equal 
importance as well. 
 
Table 3 Various estimates on scale of labor migration from Poland after 1 May 2004 (till end 
of 2005). (in thousand) 
 
Source Polish 
Ministry of 
Labor and 
Social 
Policy 
Catholic 
Church 
Media Polish 
experts 
ECAS* 
report 
 669 1 000 2 000-4 000 1 200 1 120 
 
* ECAS – European Citizen Action Service. 
Source: Kłos, B. 2006, Migracja zarobkowa Polaków do krajów UE, Indos nr 2/2006, Biuro 
Analiz Sejmowych, October. 
 
The most recent estimates by the Polish Central Statistical Office show that migratory 
flow from Poland did not stop in the year 2007 nor was it reversed. Dynamics of 
migration was lower however, the outflow still took place (see table 4). 
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Table 4 Temporary migration from Poland, 2004-2007a (in thousand) 
Number of migrants Country  
2002 
(Census 
data) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total 
 
Europe 
 
In this UE (27) 
 
In this: 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Great Britain 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
 
Countries 
outside EU 
 
In this: 
Norway 
 
786 
 
461 
 
451 
 
 
11 
14 
- 
- 
- 
0.3 
21 
249 
24 
10 
2 
39 
10 
0.3 
14 
6 
 
 
10 
 
 
- 
 
1000 
 
770 
 
750 
 
 
15 
13 
- 
- 
- 
0.4 
30 
385 
150 
13 
15 
59 
23 
0.5 
26 
11 
 
 
20 
 
 
- 
1450 
 
1200 
 
1170 
 
 
25 
21 
- 
- 
- 
0.7 
44 
430 
340 
17 
76 
70 
43 
0.6 
37 
17 
 
 
30 
 
 
- 
1950 
 
1610 
 
1550 
 
 
34 
28 
- 
- 
- 
3 
49 
450 
580 
20 
120 
85 
55 
1 
44 
25 
 
 
60 
 
 
- 
2270 
 
1925 
 
1860 
 
 
39 
31 
4 
8 
17 
4 
55 
490 
690 
20 
200 
87 
98 
1 
80 
27 
 
 
65 
 
 
36 
 
a) data pertain to the number of people staying abroad temporarily; for years 2002-2006 – longer then 
two months; for year 2007  - longer then three months. 
 
Source: Informacja o rozmiarach…Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, 2008 
  
Post enlargement labor migration has been characterized not only by its unique scale 
but also by some changes in socio-demographic characteristics of migrants. The 
2006 Communication of the European Commission on the influx of workers from the 
new Member Countries to those Member Countries who “opened” their labor markets 
after 1st May, 2004, and the British data collected under the Workers Registration 
Scheme and the Labor Force Survey categorized the profile of a migrant in two 
groups mainly: a) young, educated people whose job positions were inadequate for 
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their level of education; b) average- and low-skilled workers with jobs adequate for 
their qualifications. Furthermore, as it was confirmed by CSO data – (see table 4), 
the regional changes concerning countries of destination have been seen as well.  
GMF US – CIR SURVEY  RESULTS ON LABOR MIGRATION FROM POLAND TO THE 
UK17 
Questionnaire was applied to a target sample of 636 respondents. The sampling was 
purposeful, and the migration data were stratified with due regard to such categories 
as age, gender, education and jobs positions held in UK18. The survey research was 
conducted in London, in the autumn of 2007. 
The objectives of the survey included research on:  
• dependencies between the level of education and the amounts of money 
transferred by migrant workers; 
• role of money transfers from migrant workers contributing to a better standard 
of living; 
• attractiveness of the countries being the main destinations for migrant workers 
from Poland; 
• tendency towards returning there; 
• integration and assimilation of Poles in their host communities. 
 
The analysis of the survey allows reflection as below. The most striking factors were 
as follows:   
 
• relatively high (as compared to the young age and no work experience in 
Poland) international mobility of the analyzed sample, focused on job seeking;  
• attitude to migration treated as, in a way, a survival strategy, and the resulting 
relation: work-saving money-work to which the whole life is subordinated; 
• strong negation of Poland noticeable in the emotional responses to the 
question about possible returns; 
• tendency to come back being stronger with the female respondents; 
• positive opinions for UK and for plans to settle down there or to stay there for 
a longer time versus a complete lack of interest in the political life in UK 
manifesting itself in their non-participation in the local election, in particular in 
the context of the high level of education completed by the respondents;  
• little interest in the political life of Poland manifesting itself in the last 
parliamentary election poll, in particular in the context of the high level of 
education completed by the respondents;  
• lower readiness of the male respondents to establish closer relationships with 
their host communities, which is true, in particular, for the male respondents 
holding university degrees, as compared to bigger openness to such contacts 
proved by less educated male respondents and by the female respondents.    
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 Grant #42043 
18
 For details see Iglicka, 2008. 
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It was the male respondents who were the predominant group in the sample (53%), 
with the remaining 47% of the female respondents. 
 
The age group which prevailed among both the male and the female respondents 
was that including 25-30 year olds. They accounted for as much as 38% of all the 
respondents. Both the youngest (up to 20-year-old) and the oldest (55-60-year-old) 
respondents represented 2.5% of the sample. The average age of the male 
respondents at the time of conducting this survey was that of 30.2 years old, while for 
the female respondents that of 28.9 years old. The average age of all the 
respondents at the time of conducting this survey was  29.5 years old.  
  
The respondents holding undergraduate or postgraduate degrees and diplomas 
accounted for 36% of the sample. That proportion amounted to 43% for women, and 
to nearly 30% for men. In general, respondents with experience of higher education 
courses done in Poland, which respects both undergraduate studies and 
postgraduate courses of study for a master degree, accounted for as much as 55% 
of the analyzed sample.  
 
Both the young age of the respondents and their level of education are those 
variables which are responsible for a low level of activity of the analyzed sample in 
the labor market. 23% of the respondents had not been employed in Poland before 
leaving for UK. The activity of the women in the labor market was lower: as much as 
29% of that sub-group did not have a job when in Poland, compared to 17% of the 
men. The most often reported reasons for not having any employment record in 
Poland included: ‘I attended school’, ‘I was a student’, ’I was unemployed’.  
 
Considering the young age of the respondents, the sample demonstrated very high 
international mobility related to job seeking. As much as 75% of the male 
respondents and 64% of the female respondents had sought employment in other 
countries as well prior to their job migration to Great Britain. These results seem 
interesting considering that 23% of the respondents had had no former job 
experience in Poland.  
 
The most popular destination country for job seekers was that of Germany.  
 
Nearly 31% of the respondents had already had some experience of working in UK 
before the EU enlargement. The percentage of the respondents was not 
differentiated on the grounds of their gender in this respect. The said proportion, for 
both the male and the female respondents employed in UK prior to 1st May, 2004, 
fluctuated around 30%. This does not mean, however, that all of them settled in UK 
upon getting employed in that country. Issues pertaining to the duration of job 
migrations were reflected upon in the block of survey questions below.  
 
By asking about the year of arrival in Great Britain we wanted to find out whether 
there were any settlement processes under way, whether the duration of the 
respondents’ stays in UK was indicative of their permanent or long-term migration, 
and what the directions and effectiveness of the migration streams were. 
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27% of the respondents arrived in UK prior to the EU enlargement (1st May, 2004), 
and the remaining 73% after that date. However, if we take into account the fact that 
it was only 10% of the respondents who arrived in UK in 2007, we may be right to 
say that what is characteristic of the analyzed sample is their taking roots in UK in 
terms of the duration of their stays there, which is typical of long-term migrants. 
Those relatively long stays in UK, together with the respondents’ attitudes toward 
coming back may also be clearly indicative of their settlement plans taking shape. 
 
Migration streams intensifications were quite proportional over the years 2004-2006. 
In the year 2004 23% of the analyzed sample flowed in UK, and in 2005 that 
percentage was identical, reaching a similar level of 21% in the year 2006, but only 
as little as 10% in the year 2007. Those proportions have been confirmed by the 
Home Office latest data publications in which they indicated a decrease in the 
number of registrations under the Workers Registration Scheme pertaining to new 
Member Countries’ citizens. It should be kept in mind, however, that the same British 
data sources refer to an increase in the number of dependants of the workers already 
employed in UK, which testifies to the migration growing in volume under the 
provisions on family reunification. The tendencies pertaining to the respondents’ 
long-term or even permanent settlement plans which manifested themselves in this 
survey research seem to confirm the said direction of changes. 
 
What constituted another area of interest for us in this survey research were also the 
patterns of social and economic behaviors adopted by the analyzed sample while 
looking for their first jobs in UK.  
 
An overwhelming majority of the respondents (as much as 74% of them, including 
71% of the male respondents and 76% of the female respondents) arrived in UK 
having no idea of what kind of work they would take up or what the working 
conditions would be over there. Therefore, one may say that neither the activity of job 
centers in Poland nor the Polish awareness-raising campaign on “opening” the UK 
labor markets were those factors which considerably facilitated the respondents’ 
finding their first legal jobs in UK.  
 
What was singled out as the key factor with a positive impact on finding the first legal 
jobs in GB by the respondents was (for both the male and the female respondents) 
the help rendered by their Polish contacts in UK. Consequently, the role of the Polish 
diaspora network of contacts in UK was decisive for the respondents’ finding legal 
jobs there. Number Two determinant indicated by as much as 40% of the 
respondents was linked to the “Other” item. As it follows from the analyzed material, 
this category was most often referred to as “own initiative”, including both its most 
intelligent and dynamic manifestations and those which were the most pains-taking 
ones:  
 
11% of the female respondents and only 5% of the male respondents owed their jobs 
to the British who helped them find employment in UK. What seems to be interesting 
is that the data pertaining to the integration of Poles into the British society show a 
bigger openness of the female respondents to contacts with the local communities as 
compared with that of the male respondents. Perhaps it is just the absence of fear of 
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accepting help from the British in the initial phase of migration that gets translated 
into quicker integration further on? 
 
We were also interested to hear about the jobs performed by the respondents, 
whether they corresponded with their qualifications or required lower level skills, and 
whether any of the respondents had been promoted at work.  
 
65% of the respondents held jobs suitable for their qualifications. That group included 
individuals with completed primary or secondary education who found employment 
as average or low skilled workers. The occupations most often reported by that group 
of respondents included those of construction workers, plumbers, dustmen, shop 
assistants, caretakers in social welfare homes, carpenters, engineers, welders, store-
keepers, leaflet distributors, metal coating workers, diggers, electricians, mechanics, 
etc. 
 
What may be interesting is that a relatively high percentage of the respondents 
holding university degrees had found in UK jobs corresponding with their 
qualifications. However, those of the respondents with completed higher education 
courses who held jobs for which they had been trained at university were employed 
in Polish centers as more broadly understood. Therefore, I have also included in that 
group Polish language teachers (holders of a master degree in Polish Language and 
Literature) who had found jobs in Polish schools in London, journalists who had 
embarked on careers in journalism in UK working for Polish newspapers or for the 
Polish radio, as well as fresh graduates in English Language and Literature teaching 
English to Polish children in UK. 
 
35% of the respondents, i.e. 27% of the male respondents and as much as 43% of 
the female respondents worked in UK in areas having nothing to do with their original 
qualifications. This was mostly true for respondents holding undergraduate and 
graduate degrees.  
 
It was the average net monthly earnings (in PLN) ranging from 4,000 to 6,000 PLN19 
that prevailed in the analyzed sample. Such were the amounts reported by as much 
as 34% of the survey respondents. As for the lowest net earnings ranging from 2,000 
to 4,000 PLN, they were reported by 24% of the respondents, while the highest 
earnings (above 10,000 PLN) were reported by 10% of the respondents.  
 
Our basic analysis of the sample structure reveals a significant differentiation in 
earnings on the grounds of gender within the highest earnings group. As much as 
17% of the male respondents and only 3% of the female respondents reported the 
highest level of earnings: above 10,000 PLN. At the same time, the percentage of 
female respondents reporting the lowest earnings ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 PLN 
was similar to that of the male respondents in that sub-group, on the level of ca. 24%. 
The average monthly earnings in the sub-group of male respondents amounted to 
6,404 PLN, while for female respondents it was 5,972 PLN. The average net monthly 
earnings of the analyzed sample amounted to 5,972 PLN. 
 
                                                 
19
 As for October 2008 the exchange rate was 1 PLN – 4.3 GBP 
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65% of the respondents reported that they were able to save some money / that they 
had savings earned in UK. The percentage of male respondents in that sub-group 
was on the level of 68%, while the corresponding value for women was only 63%. 
Some of the survey respondents suggested that their stays in UK were too short so 
that they could save any money. The survey interviewers noticed that respondents 
were rather unwilling to give answers related to their savings and to the appropriation 
of such savings. The average net monthly savings earned in UK and reported by the 
respondents amounted to 1,230 PLN for the female respondents, and to 1.570 PLN 
for the male respondents. The average net monthly savings for the whole sample 
group were on the level of 1,400 PLN. 
 
60% of the respondents who had savings reported sending them to Poland.  
 
In most cases, the savings were wire transferred to Poland: as much as 52% of the 
respondents reported such transfers. However, the traditional method of bringing the 
saved money to Poland “personally, during travel home” also enjoyed considerable 
popularity: 35% of the respondents reported such “transfers”.  
 
In general, those who were saving the money earned in UK could be divided into two 
sub-groups: those providing for their families, and those attempting to invest in 
Poland or in Great Britain (on their way to well-being). As for the most frequently 
cited investment, it was a flat of one’s own: obviously the most desired objective and 
one difficult to reach for a number of successive generations of Poles. Unlike the 
surveyed students of elite Warsaw schools for higher education working in the USA 
under the Work and Travel Program who mostly appropriated their savings for stock 
investment, tuition fees, and entertainment / foreign travel, the repeating motif in the 
responses given by the “British” sample was that of everyday life as not seen through 
rose-tinted glasses. The collected material respecting the earnings and the savings 
of the analyzed sample, both in its quantitative and in its qualitative aspect, is a sad 
picture of a generation of those who have been, in a way, excluded, and whose 
migration is an attempt at securing a certain basic standard of living for themselves 
and for their relatives.    
 
The collected material related to attitudes towards possible returns could be used to 
write a similarly pessimistic scenario. It is worth pointing out here that Poland seen by 
the “British” respondents is totally different from Poland in the eyes of the 
respondents who have migrated to the USA under the Work and Travel Program. A 
strong negation of Poland noticeable in the emotional responses gathered in the 
“British” survey is as surprising as the strong patriotic attitudes typical of the 
“American” survey. 
 
As a matter of fact, most of the respondents (51% of them) answered that they 
wanted to come back to Poland  as compared to 23% of those who were decided not 
to come back, but a further analysis of the time horizon for such returns, as well as 
the qualitative material gathered in the survey, are not indicative of a high level of 
certainty about their coming back, and, if so, such returns should rather be expected 
over a longer time horizon.     
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In general, the female respondents showed a bigger inclination to come back earlier. 
37% of them stated their readiness to come back that year, or in 1-2 years’ time. The 
proportion of the male respondents reporting their return planned over such a time 
horizon was on the level of 25%. 
 
As much as 32% of the respondents stated that their return, if any, should take place 
no sooner than in 5-10 years’ time. As little as 9% responded that they should come 
back as early as that year.  
 
What results from the existing knowledge about the life of Poles (Polish job migrants) 
in UK after 2004 is that quite many of them have started thinking of settling down in 
UK as in their destination country. Quite a number of them are highly satisfied with 
their decision to stay on and settle down. What we wanted to verify through this 
survey research was whether the respondents had participated in the local elections 
in UK: it is obvious that Poles, as the EU citizens from the 2004 year, may take part 
in such elections held in any EU member country. Political participation is indicative 
of a political and social involvement in the problems of the destination country, and, 
in a way, a measure of the migrants’ integration into the host community. 
 
None of the respondents participated in the local elections in UK. It is worth 
mentioning that 6% of the sample did not understand the question. They thought that 
the opinions sought from them were to be about the election in Poland, and, by way 
of justifying their absence, they wrote (selection of the most interesting opinions, 
K.I.): “I cannot stand PiS (Law and Justice);”, “I abhor communists;”, “PO (Civic 
Platform) are wrigglers.”   
 
The justifications provided for the political non-participation of the respondents may 
be grouped as follows: 70% of the respondents replied that they were not interested 
in politics, that it was too soon for them to have a clear understanding of the political 
situation in UK, that they were still more concerned about the political situation in 
Poland. 10% of the respondents knew that such elections had been held during their 
stay in UK, but excused themselves by referring to their difficult economic situation:  
  
10% of the respondents did not know whether there had been any local elections in 
UK during their stay there, while 4% claimed that there had been no such elections.  
 
Although the surveyed respondents claimed that they were all the time concerned 
about the political life in Poland, this did not get translated into their more active 
participation in the last election. As little as 7% of the respondents took part in it. The 
preferences within that group (of 44 persons) were distributed among PO (Civic 
Platform: the prevailing number of the votes cast), LiD (Leftists and Democrats, 
second to PO), PiS (Law and Justice, Number Three), and PSL (Polish People’s 
Party, Number Four). 
 
As for the Polish election, it may be justifiable to think that in the future the 
percentage of those participating in such election should be higher as the 
respondents complained, first and foremost, about a disastrous organization of the 
election. 
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As for integration in Great Britain in general, it was the female respondents who had 
demonstrated greater readiness for establishing closer relationships, other than the 
working ones, with the British as compared with the male respondents. Nearly 59% 
of the female respondents had such relationships, when for the male respondents the 
corresponding proportion was on the level of only 48%. What is interesting, the male 
respondents holding undergraduate or postgraduate degrees proved a proportionally 
smaller number of contacts other than the working ones with the British as compared 
with men who had primary or secondary education completed. As for the female 
respondents, it was only those with high school or undergraduate diplomas who had 
fewer contacts other than the working ones with the British. 
 
The grounds provided for weak personal relationships of the respondents with the 
representatives of the host communities included both the argumentation referring to 
cultural differences, and to the social and economic status of Poles in UK. 
 
The above results are not representative. As it has already been mentioned, the 
survey research was done on a sample representative of the generation of the 
excluded ones who, through migration, strive to secure a certain basic standard of 
living for themselves and for their relatives. What is typical of that group is, in my 
opinion, their young age on the one hand (the average age of Respondent at the time 
of the survey research: 29.5 years old), and their high level of education and low 
level of activity in the labor market in Poland, on the other hand. The profile of the 
sample is that of long-term migrants with quite clear plans to settle down in UK. 
COSTS AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF LABOR MIGRATION– DEMOGRAPHIC AND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF A SOURCE COUNTRY 
The scale of post accession migration wave took experts by surprise. The character 
and scale of migration from Poland are of considerable significance, not only for 
politicians in the CEE countries, but also for those shaping EU migration policy and 
those involved in European integration. There are plenty of economic and social 
consequences of the outflow of migrants that are of great importance for both 
receiving and sending areas.   
 
Since the beginning of 1970s the registered ouflow from Poland oscillated at 20-25 
thousand yearly. It declined during the 1990s mainly because of social and economic 
changes and new opportunities for young, urban professionals. At that time 
emigration has slowly become a domain of blue-collar workers unable to adapt to 
market requirements (Iglicka, 2001).  
 
Therefore it was predicted that since the second half of the 1990s, along with the 
successful and dynamic progress of the economic transformation and, social 
changes Poland would gradually shift from a major sending country of the CEE 
region into a country of net-immigration and transit migration. The data suggested 
growing trends in the inflow of labor immigrants, refugees and transit migrants into 
Poland. 
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However, Poland's accession to the EU in May 2004 caused one of the biggest out 
migration in the post-war history of the country, and Poland became again one of the 
biggest exporter of labor forces. This time, within the enlarged EU.  
 
It is difficult to offer explicit conclusions that could follow from the profit and loss 
account of the most recent wave of job migrations from Poland, and from reflecting 
on its consequences. However, in my opinion, the massive proportions of this outflow 
have resulted in its negative consequences outweighing its advantages. In the final 
result, however, a lot shall depend on what percentage of today’s migrants will return 
to Poland, what their equipment in the form of the relevant job experience and skills 
will be, and how they will schedule their returns. 
 
A negative natural population growth of 0.01% for 1997 rose to - 0.08% in 2006 
(Central Statistical Office, 2008). Besides a decrease in the number of births, 
migrations were the other factor accounting for a real reduction in the population of 
Poland. The phenomenon of massive migration of young and educated job seekers 
results, in the long run, in the seepage of the nation’s  skilled labor and in the human 
capital reduction.   
 
What can be counted among the advantages of the migration outflow on the macro 
level is definitely its lessening the tension in the social relations caused by the difficult 
situation in the labor market (pay tensions, the level of poverty). The unemployment 
rate in Poland has decreased from 20% reported for the beginning of 2004 to 9.5% 
(Autumn, 2008). Therefore, it is difficult to assert that the Polish labor market has lost 
as a result of the failed opportunity to provide employment for the young and well 
educated people. The Polish labor market seemed to be incapable of 
accommodating such a massive inflow of fresh graduates ready to enter it.  
 
Additionally, an unusual increase in remunerations has been reported recently. In the 
period form February, 2007, to February, 2008, the average pay in Poland increased 
by 10% which meant an even faster increase in remunerations than that reported for 
Spain, Greece, or Portugal upon their accession to the EU.  This is why it is 
considered that there is a need for a decidedly slower pay growth rate: to avoid 
running the risk of inflation. The most pessimistic scenario by the World Bank 
assumes that in the year 2009 the level of inflation in Poland may even hover around 
8% (the corresponding figure for January, 2008, was 4.6%). 
 
On the other hand however, the increase in remunerations which can be seen 
recently results in a corresponding increase in the labor costs, and consequently, in 
the lowered attractiveness of Poland for foreign direct investors. 
 
Who are direct beneficiaries of the migrations are, in most cases, the Polish 
immigrants who have found legal jobs and legal opportunities to earn money abroad. 
However, a conclusion which seems to be self-evident at this point is that, since most 
of them are taking up jobs for which the required level of competence and education 
is lower than theirs, some of them may soon turn out to be the greatest losers in this 
process. There will be no big chances for them to get promoted in Great Britain; nor 
will they have such opportunities in Poland after the years of doing unskilled jobs in 
the service sector. Should they come back to Poland anyway, we may have to deal, 
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in lots of cases, with the phenomenon of double marginalization which may result in 
an increase in the unemployment rates, in particular when shown by region.   
 
The next issue is related to the social costs of the outflow process, namely to the 
costs of separation from the family, of family disintegration, and of the lowering 
growth dynamics in certain regions related to the weakening of social ties. Recently, 
a new term has appeared in the media discourse on the consequences of migrations: 
Euro-orphans, children placed in orphanages or children’s homes because of their 
parent / their parents seeking jobs abroad. Mass media quote their data revealing the 
existence of as many as 150,000 so-called Euro-orphans in Poland. However, since 
this phenomenon does not enable any reliable assessment, the numbers should, in 
my opinion, be treated prudently20. The research commissioned by the Office of the 
Children’s Ombudsman in the period from February to March, 2008, shows that this 
number may hover around the level of 10-15 thousand pupils, which, on the other 
hand, is disquieting in itself (Biuletyn Migracyjny – extra edition for March-April, 2008) 
 
Money transfers from migrants are one of the advantages of the outflow of job-
seeking population abroad. According to the report by the Ministry of Economy 
(Impact of the Migration … , 2007) the earnings transferred from the Polish migrants’ 
accounts reached in 2005 the level of 1% of the GDP, i.e. 3% of the exports and 30% 
of the total of the foreign direct investment capital inflow to Poland in the years 2004-
2005. Consequently, the transfers may, in the short run, counterbalance the outflow 
of funds due to investment-reluctant behavior of foreign direct investors in Poland. In 
the long run, however, as it is shown in the migration theory, job seeking migrants 
start shifting to different thinking patters: no longer focused on their homeland, but on 
their new prospects in the receiving countries which tells itself in lower levels of 
money transfers, for example (Castels and Miller, 1993).  
 
In accordance with the estimates of the National Bank of Poland, in 2007 the 
emigrants transferred to Poland more than 20 billion zlotys. That amount was by 2.8 
billion zlotys bigger than the transfers made in 2006, and more than twice as big as 
the transfers made in the year 2004. The biggest amounts, hovering around the level 
of 5 billion zlotys altogether, were sent by the Poles employed in Great Britain. 
Ireland, with the corresponding amount of 4.6 billion zlotys, came second to the UK. 
Germany which, as early as 2005, was in the lead in respect of the money transfers 
to Poland has recently dropped to number three. According to the NBP, the United 
States is also losing to a number of EU countries out of which it is Italy, the 
Netherlands, France and Norway which are the most important in this context.   
 
As it follows from the report by the Ministry of Economy (Wpływ emigracji… , 2007), 
the volume of the cash in circulation (excluding the cash at bank) increased from 50 
to 67 billion zlotys in the period from May, 2004 to October, 2006. Since the volume 
of bank deposits for that period remained unchanged the authors of this report 
ascertain that what was mainly responsible for that increase was bigger amounts of 
foreign currencies exchanged into zlotys at money exchanges offices. What could be 
seen in the structure of foreign currency purchases effected by banks with the 
                                                 
20
 http://fakty.interia.pl/prasa/polityka/news/eurosieroty,1010372  
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participation of both natural persons and money exchange offices was a significant 
increase in the British pound (GBP) share. In 2006 the total of the Pound Sterling 
purchases accounted for as little as 6% of the total of all the purchased foreign 
currencies, and equaled 401 billion EUR. In 2005 the Pound Sterling purchases 
whose worth was already on the level of 761 billion PLN accounted for as much as 
12% of the total of the foreign currency purchases made for that year to rise, in the 
first half of 2006, to 15% (equivalent to 541 billion EUR). 
Reflecting on the effects of money transfers one should not leave out of account their 
negative consequences related to the moral-hazard problem. Researchers dealing 
with the impact of money transfers from migrating family members upon the 
behaviors and the economic coping strategies of the households in the receiving 
countries noticed that the families of migrating job seekers, left behind in the country 
of their origin, gradually reduced their occupational and money-earning activity 
relying on the money transfers as a method to secure their well-being (Kyle 2000, 
Pries 2006). As a result, this may lead to economic stagnation, in particular on the 
regional level. 
It poses a significant threat to Poland. The most recent results of the survey done on 
the Polish migrants in Great Britain, included in this analysis, indicate that most 
migrants do not think of making big investments or improving their standard of living 
through the migration. Their savings mostly serve various consumption needs, as 
well as meeting the ongoing needs of their families left behind in Poland.  
Table 5 Profit and loss account for the job migrations after 2004  
Level / scope  Advantages Disadvantages 
Macro (national 
level) 
• Decrease in the unemployment rate 
(export of unemployment, in 
particular as shown by region). 
• Increase in earnings. 
 
• Real reduction in population. 
• Seepage of the nation’s 
skilled labor. 
• Human capital reduction. 
• Inflation risk. 
• Lowered attractiveness for 
foreign direct investors. 
• Shortages in the labor 
market. 
• Lowered growth dynamics (in 
particular, as shown by 
region). 
Mezo 
(household and 
family level) 
• Money transfers (increased 
consumption, covered costs of the 
current expenses, investments)  
• Separation / family 
disintegration. 
• Weakened social ties  (in 
particular, as shown by 
region). 
• Reduced economic activity of 
households (the moral-hazard 
problem). 
Micro 
(individual 
level) 
• Job opportunities 
• Earnings 
• Possibility to develop job 
experience, acquire new skills, and 
raise qualifications  
• ‘Brain waste’ phenomenon. 
• No chances for development 
abroad; no possibility to 
develop in the country (on a 
long-term basis). 
Phenomenon of double 
marginalization. Social 
exclusion. 
Source: Own compilation  
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One of the consequences of the most recent wave of migrations from Poland were, 
irrespective of a still high unemployment rate, shortages of labor force in the labor 
market. At the beginning of 2006 as much as 20% of construction companies 
complained about labor shortages respecting medium- and low-skilled workers 
(compared with as little as 4% reported for that sector before 1st May, 2004). By way 
of comparison: 21% of companies operating in the car market (as contrasted with 7% 
before the EU enlargement), 25% of companies representing the furniture sector (as 
contrasted with 11% before the EU enlargement), as much as 34% of the 
woodworking industry, 24% of the papermaking industry, and 23% of the Hi-Fi sector 
complained about shortages in the labor force at the beginning of 2006.  
 
The educational system reform in the second half of the 1990s resulted in closing a 
majority of vocational schools and a considerable number of technical schools. 
Teachers employed there were, naturally, made to change their qualifications, as a 
result of which today’s unemployed may not be trained so quickly as the employers 
looking for labor force would wish.  
 
The lobbying done by organizations of employers desperate for workers was so hard 
that it caused a change in the migration policy strategy for Poland which, before 
2006, was restrictive about the presence of foreigners legally employed in Poland 
aiming, first and foremost, in the context of the high local unemployment rate, at the 
protection of the domestic labor market against the inflow of potential immigrants. 
 
The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy opted for a possibility to employ foreign 
contract workers from India, China, or Bangladesh in Polish enterprises. That draft 
project was, however, rejected by the Ministry of Interior and Administration on the 
grounds that, for most of the workers from the Far East employed in Poland, having a 
job in our country may only be a transitional phase in their migration to any of the old 
EU-15 member countries. 
 
The Polish labor market opened itself to the East, but, instead, to the Most Near 
East: to the closest neighbors of Poland. On 31st August, 2006, Polish employers got 
authorization to employ workers from the three countries by which Poland is 
bordered to the east. Ukrainian, Russian and Belarus workers could be employed in 
Poland for three months in each six-month period, for which they were not required to 
have work permits. However, it was only the farming sector that was concerned in 
the waived requirement for work permits. The pressure from employers seeking to 
hire foreign workers, especially in the construction sector, brought about still another 
modification. In June, 2007, the right to employ foreign workers with no permit 
required was extended to cover all the sectors of the Polish economy. However, the 
provision enabling employers to contract foreigners for only three months in each 
half-a-year period was still in force.  
 
The demand of labor markets for both skilled and unskilled labor force caused further 
changes in the legal system and still more facilitated the procedures for employing 
workers from over the eastern border of Poland. On 1st February, 2008, the right to 
stay in Poland under a labor contract was extended to cover six months in each 
period of 12 successive months. 
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The consequences of facilitating the relevant procedures as described above are 
clearly reflected in the statistics. In the first half of 2007 Polish employers filed 23.115 
requests for contract workers from the east out of which number 21.513 concerned 
Ukrainians, 1,400 – Belarus workers, and 202 – workers from Russia. In the second 
half of 2007 the number of such requests increased to 24.500. 
 
RETURN MIGRATION? 
 
It was stressed at the beginning of this paper that migratory stereotypes are 
historically rooted in the perception of population outflows and inflows as settlement 
migration. It seems however,  that contrary to contemporary opinions on growing 
trends in a circular labor mobility and decreasing trends in long-term or permanent 
migration on the east-west European axis the post enlargement labor migration from 
Poland may support the old stereotype. To support this thesis recent estimates on 
migratory flows from Poland and data on remittances transferred are presented 
below. 
 
A principle of international migration is that networks between sending and receiving 
areas are maintained by an ongoing process of return migration comprising both 
recurrent migrants who regularly go home for varying periods each year and 
previously settled migrants who settle back in their communities of origin (Massey et 
al., 1987). That every migration stream breeds a counter stream (Ravenstain, 1885), 
and the process of settlement in a receiving area is partially countered by a 
concomitant return migration (Cornelius, 1978; Mines 1981) are sociological truism. 
However, that which is the norm for migratory behaviors for certain ethnic groups 
was not visible among the Poles spread all over the world during the communist era 
(Iglicka, 2001:106). 
 
Before the First and the Second World Wars, many Polish emigrants did return to 
their homeland. Return migration from America to Polish territory prior to the First 
World War was estimated at approximately 30 per cent of the original emigration 
(Walaszek, 1984; Pilch and Zgorniak, 1984).  After the Second World War however, 
the stream of return migration diminished to a trickle (Iglicka, 2001:106).  
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Enormous range of Polish emigration, which had been earlier in focus of the global 
debate, have surrendered its seat to the question whether and how many of Polish 
emigrants are returning in face of the better economic situation in Poland.  
The discrepancies appear in large number in the mass media coverage. The latter 
often dwells on the estimates based on various surveys among small samples, not 
representative of all who left the country. Allegedly Polish emigrants are coming back 
or do want to do so, but such an anecdotal evidence cannot serve as facts and real 
numbers’ substitute, especially when those deny such opinion. Thus such estimates 
might be a part of political tactic aimed at encouraging emigrants to return or the 
uncertain anticipation of the trend that might happen but is not taking place now 
(Iglicka, Ziolek, forthcoming).   
Central Statistical Office in its most recent estimates reports that at the end of 2007, 
2 270 thousands of Polish citizens migrated temporarily abroad, nearly two million of 
them to the other European countries. Such numbers indicate the constant increase 
in Polish emigration. In comparison to the data from 2006, 320 thousands more 
Polish citizens have been registered in foreign countries. However, while these 
estimates do not include those who work illegally or some seasonal workers, who 
usually stay up to 3 months and very often are not registered at all, some statistics of 
the destination countries might be misleading.  
 
Chart 5 Trends in Polish labor temporary migration to 
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Source: Informacja o rozmiarach…Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, 2008 
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The reports that base their conclusions on Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) in the 
Great Britain will be a good example here, for they arguing that the number of Polish 
emigrants in the UK significantly decreases. This in turn not necessarily indicates that 
the return migration starts in Poland, as many of Polish emigrants might simply not 
be registered at all. 
That some of Polish emigrants might have changed their destination country, leaving 
GB for places where the living and working conditions are better, like to the emerging 
new destinations, e.g. Norway or Spain, is also worth mentioning. Automatically they 
are out of WRS, but still not back in Poland (see chart 5).  
The data from the National Bank of  Poland (NBP) provide another indicator of 
stabilizing or even strengthening of the Polish emigration abroad. More than PLN 20 
billions (about  EURO 6,25 billions) was transferred to Poland by short and long-term 
emigrants in 2007 and despite steadily appreciation of Polish currency, it is more 
than double in comparison to the year 2004. It is the result of a better positions of  
Polish emigrants and network building on the labor markets abroad.   
 
The newest NBP data also indicate that even within the last year there is a quite a 
change in earnings send to Poland. The amount of money transferred to Poland in 
the first decade of 2008 was by 100 millions higher than in the first decade of 2007.     
 
Moreover, in 2007, workers’ remittances tripled when compared with 2004 overall. 
Ireland and Great Britain were the countries where such significant increase has 
been noticed distinctly. (see Chart 6 below).  
 
Chart 6 Geographical breakdown of workers’ remittances 2004, 2007. 
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the exact migration situation of the present. The latter depends on the media and 
politicians in their potential use or misuse for the purpose of shaping public opinion. 
By no means, however, the anecdotal evidences from the press can uproot the truth 
of the Polish emigration, which is still on the increase (Iglicka, Ziolek, forthcoming).  
I am assuming that contemporary Polish wage migrants will not behave as the 
migrants of the communist period, when the departure from Poland meant one way 
departure only. However, even if contemporary Polish migrants in the UK will repeat 
behavioral pattern of their ancestors, leaving to America and coming back in one 
third of their number, it should not be forgotten that it means the most of them will 
remain on emigration. In regard to what was stated above, frequently repeated issue 
that “there is nothing more permanent than a temporary migrant”, borne out of 
experiences of the postwar Europe, may be also repeated in case of post-accession 
migrations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The tendency of a decreasing attractiveness of the U.S. as a migration country has 
been observed on a global scale since 2001. The number of issued student visas in 
the years 2001-2003 decreased by 80 thousand (27%) and the number of visas 
issued to skilled workers dropped by 60 thousand (which was also equal to 27%)21.  
 
Recent studies conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center demonstrate that U.S. 
immigration policy after  September 11th produced the least expected results: legal 
migration to the USA has decreased whereas the ever-so-strong demand for labor in 
American economy led to the increase of illegal migration, mostly from the Latin 
America and Asia22. 
 
The dramatically diminished attractiveness of the U.S. as a country of both 
settlement and labor migration for young and educated people from Central Europe 
is due to economic factors and geopolitical factors, i.e. dollar decline versus Polish 
zloty and EU enlargement and not to a restrictive immigration policy. 
 
Studies on labor migration to the USA revealed that young respondents emphasized 
the importance of cultural differences and negative stereotypes of Poles in the U.S. 
as one of the obstacles to their settlement in the USA. 
 
Historically different socio-economic-cultural circumstances of a Polish ethnic 
community in the States and European countries can also account for the fall of an 
American myth among young Poles at the beginning of the 21st century in the period 
of far-reaching modernization.  
 
                                                 
21
 Wucker, M., 2006, National Security and Noncitizens in the United States after 9/11, in: K. Iglicka 
(red), Immigration Policies and Security, CSM, Warszawa. 
22
  Witt, A., 2006 (:11), ‘Challenges in the Area of Immigration, Integration and Security’, in: K. Iglicka 
(ed), Immigration Policies and Security, CSM, Warszawa .    
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As a result of the emergence of private tertiary education services on the market 
higher education became in the period of transformation a readily available 
commodity for the residents of small towns and villages23. 
 
Young inhabitants of small localities, large numbers of whom have been recently 
graduating from colleges and universities and who have become familiar with the big 
city life during their studies, decided after 2004 to migrate to European countries 
rather than to the US, where their lives and work would be essentially limited to a 
narrow and controlling milieu of a Polish community. 
 
Decline of the U.S. popularity as a migration destination for young and educated 
people is also accentuated by official data on visa issuance. Indeed, it seems that the 
United States lost Central Europeans in the global competition for labor.  
 
The globalization of trade and labor markets along with decreasing demographic 
potential of Europe requires certain opening of the borders that is not easily 
reconcilable with the entrance control measures deployed. Therefore, in particular 
EU-15 member states, aside from taking into consideration new areas emitting 
immigrants, the tacit presupposition is adopted that the demand for low and medium 
skilled labor force is satisfied in these countries by employees from the new member 
states, arriving within the framework of the migrations inside the EU and within the 
framework of successive so called openings of labor markets. Highly qualified 
personnel in turn is to be recruited from the Third World countries. 
 
There is an amount of logic in these assumptions. The immigrants performing minor 
jobs and descending from other cultures were associated in the past in receiving 
societies of Western Europe mostly with the pathologies of all kinds. On the other 
hand, the immigrants performing minor jobs and without the possibility of promotion 
felt socially and culturally alienated. Such situation brought to exclusion of 
substantial, foreign part of West Europe societies, formation of ethnic ghettos, 
emerging of social tensions and crisis of multicultural model as a result24. 
 
Well educated immigrants working on the slots in line with their profession were 
never a problem for Europe. The poor ones were a problem. Such assumption will 
therefore level, on my opinion, possible cultural tensions. The Poles, the Lithuanians, 
the Czechs and the Slovakians easily integrate; the religious or cultural conflicts 
between newcomers and receiving society are also not possible. The question 
                                                 
23
 In the period of last 15 years the number of students in the tertiary education has increased in a 
whole Central European region. Consequently, percentage of students in the EU- 15 is currently lower 
than the percentage of students in new EU member countries. For more detail see: . Weizsacker, J., 
2006, ‘Welcome to Europe: A European Blue Card Proposal’ in: K.Gmaj i K. Iglicka  (eds), Brain Drain 
or Brain Gain – a Global Dilemma, CSM, Warszawa.  
24
 Also the latest report of British House of Lords warns that in the case of the UK the greatest defeated of the last 
immigration wave are participant/immigrants of the previous waves, who do not yet integrated with the British 
society and already begun to lose with the cheaper employees from the EU-8 on the labor market. The report 
warns also that in the long perspective the positive effects of the last wave of immigration for the British economy 
will be leveled by the remittances from the social security system  (www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.com/pa/Id/Ideconaf.htm). So it is to be remembered that also in countries that made relatively few mistakes 
in their immigration and integration policies it is emigrants who always pay costs and it is their presence always in 
connection with the tensions in welcoming society. 
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remaining open is where the new member states, including Poland, may/are able to 
gain employees from, both skilled and not, in the days of global and very strong labor 
force competition? 
 
However the biggest mistake in migration policies was made by South Europe 
countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002), which showed inability to adapt administration 
structures to changing global migration patterns. Through the specific migration 
control model consisting of issuing limited number of visas with labor permission, by 
establishing of extremely difficult conditions for employers who wanted to employ 
legal migrant-workers the governments of South Europe states closed in certain way 
the door for legal inflow. At the same time, governments of those countries did not 
undertake the least effort to control their borders (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002:255). As a 
result in Southern European model we have to do with rapidly growing number of 
illegal migrants that slipped out of state’s control, and with anxiety in receiving 
societies concerning range of illegal migration. In addition, performed regulatory 
actions that resulted in hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants legalizing their stay, 
encourage next waves of illegal newcomers, and the circle closes that way. 
When USA or the Southern Europe countries had been creating the frameworks of 
their migration policies, the firm international framework limiting individual approach 
of a given country to the recruitment of employees did not even exist. In present 
times there is a lot of such limitations. Moreover, the global labor force competition is 
stronger and the specter of European demographic crisis is often and often taken into 
consideration by policy makers considering programs and schemes of the immigrant 
labor force recruitment. Poland should develop own migration policy based on 
models of old immigrational countries of Europe, such as Austria and Germany (the 
Middle-East Europe immigrational states without colonies and with equal approach to 
the idea of nation state25 forming at the same time) by creating encouragement for 
highly skilled immigrants from outside of the EU countries and not allowing to many 
unskilled worker recruitment programs. Recruitment of the last category might be 
stimulated indirectly by the repatriation channel or by the programs of recruitment of 
seasonal laborers.  
However, I think that in order to not to be on a hiding to nothing in the global struggle 
for the foreign labor force, the common strategy for the block of the countries during 
the process of migration transformation shall be developed on international scene. 
Thus, working out common premises in regard to directions and political strategies of 
migration policy in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, as well as the countries 
during the process of migration transformation would be also desirable. 
Many analysts think that new member states will imitate the pattern of countries of 
Southern Europe in their migration politics, that is the countries which transformed 
                                                 
25
 From historical point of view in more countries of the Central-Eastern Europe the prevailing criterion 
of nationality was ethnicity or belonging to the cultural group. In the Central-Eastern Europe countries 
that existed at the meeting point of cultures and religions over centuries, endangered by pillaging, 
invasions and partitions, and which actively took part in dawns and collapses of empires, partitions, 
loosing and regaining independence, unifications and divisions, one of not formally articulated political 
aims was to retain cultural one-sidedness. Although in the days of globalization of labor markets and 
mass international  migrations such aim seems to be difficult to achieve in itself, yet belonging to the 
civic society is not regarded - subconsciously or consciously – as simultaneous and automatic 
belonging to the national state in this part of Europe. For more see: Castles and Miller (1993). 
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quite recently from emigration to immigration areas. In certain sense Polish migration 
policy allowed in the past quasi-Italian model to come into being, when legions of 
newcomers from Ukraine begun illegal work in Poland. It should not be allowed 
however in the Polish discourse to the situation where these legions become some 
time “army of evil”26 – and that is easy to achieve through the fact of inhibiting the 
legal inflow with simultaneous consent to illegal one. 
The last maneuvers in immigration policies of such countries as Germany, France, 
United Kingdom or USA show adaptive capabilities of contemporary democracies. 
Democratic state has the possibility of inflow control, and the increase in the number 
of migrants may take place through legal channels of migration. In the case of USA, 
continuously high level of illegal migrations is being justified rather by cultural and 
historical factors than economic or demographic situation (Weil, 1998).  
In the days of increased competition for the legal inflow of immigrants and control 
over the illegal one, one should nevertheless consider the flexible treatment of 
temporal migrants, that is the migrant working guests. American experiences with 
programs of employees’ recruitment as well as European teach that with the 
emergence of working guests, durable connection networks between the emitting 
and receiving countries come into being, the networks that are the source of illegal 
migration in the future. Hence one should not apply single solution model. As was 
already mentioned in the earlier fragments of this paper, creating of return stimuli is 
effective only in the case of certain temporal migrants, while the other should have 
the possibility of application for permanent stay in migration country, after years of 
stay. 
Another matter connected with temporal migrants concerns the issue of exploitation 
of foreign laborers and execution of law in the principles of programs for foreign 
laborers. 
In the view of these investigations the proposals presented by American 
administration in the year 2004 seem to be worth considering also in Polish situation. 
Namely the proposal that the social insurance premiums be paid after coming back of 
temporal migrant to the native country and that the visa with work permission should 
not be tied to one employer only. The possibility of signing the agreements on social 
insurance with countries of eastern neighborhood is worth being considered as well. 
  
Future changes in the population trends and in the strategies of migration policies in 
Central-Eastern Europe are quite a challenge both for researchers and the policy 
makers. 
 
                                                 
26
 The Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, next day after winning a election (April 
2008), said, One of the first thing my government is going to do is closing the borders and 
building the camps, where I will isolate from society those newcomers from outside the Italy, 
who are not employed and enter the path of crime. Illegal immigrants are the army of evil. We 
need more police on the streets. The officers must become the army of good that will isolate 
decent citizens from the army of evil (Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 April 2008). 
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The result of research presented in this analysis shows deeper, as transatlantic, 
dimension of Europeans' migrations. I hope that realization of postulate put forward 
by Thistlethwaite (1963), one of the migration research's classics, the postulate (that 
is half of a century old) to tear down the curtain of salty water and analyze migrations 
both from American and European perspectives, will contribute to better 
understanding of mechanisms underlying phenomenon of migration and will help to 
work out better solutions in regard to recruitment of foreign workers on the both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
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